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1
INTRODUCTION
Self-determination of  peoples was recognised in the very
first Article of  the 1945 Charter of  the United Nations,
as a principle. Self-determination hence is one of  the four
basic purposes the United Nations shall fulfill, on an
equal footing with peace and security, human rights and
(sustainable) development.
The right to self-determination was recognised as a right
in both the two central UN human rights treaties of
1966; the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The most interesting part of
Article 1, in which this right is recognised, is in
paragraph 2:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to
any obligations arising out of  international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit,
and international law. In no case may a people be deprived
of its own means of subsistence.
This article will analyse the content and actual application
of  this human right of  peoples. Of  particular relevance
is how this principle applies in the context of  Western
Sahara. It will also be analysed whether other
international treaties are relevant for understanding the
scope of the right of peoples to dispose of their natural
resources, including a prohibition against deprivation
of  a people’s own means of  subsistence.
2
THE RESOURCE DIMENSION OF
THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
Article 1 of  the two UN covenants sets out collective
rights, which provides both a background against which
the individual rights shall be understood, as well as
serving as an important precondition for the exercise
of  the individual rights.1
An author understands this paragraph as constituting
an obligation on the States ‘to take measures to ensure
that its own people are not in any case deprived of  its
own means of  subsistence, including food […] and to
investigate any situation where such deprivation is
alleged to be occuring’.2 Another author argues that the
right to ownership of  natural resources is absolutely
crucial for the realisation of  the right to food.3
The wording of  Article 1 is identical in the two 1966
Covenants, but their coverage must be considered to be
a reflection of  their different scope, with one covenant
recognising and regulating economic, social and cultural
human rights, and the other civil and political rights, and to
a certain extent also cultural rights, in the context of minorities.4
Article 1 has not been applied by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but has been
applied by the Human Rights Committee, in the context
of  rights of  indigenous peoples. Moreover, the resource
dimension of  the right to self-determination has recently
been confirmed by the International Law Commission.5
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1 The Human Rights Committee has issued a General
Comment on Article 1, in which the Committee states, ‘The
right of  self-determination is of  particular importance
because its realization is an essential condition for the
effective guarantee and observance of  individual human
rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those
rights.’ See General Comment No. 12 under International
Covenant of  Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Geneva, 13
March 1984, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
0/f3c99406d528f37fc12563ed004960b4?Opendocument.
2 Philip Alston, ‘International Law and the Human Right to
Food’, in P. Alston and K. Tomasevski eds., The Right to Food
9, 40 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1984).
3 Jan Hancock, Environmental Human Rights: Power, Ethics and
Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). He considers the right to
ownership of  resources as an ‘environmental human right’
found to be necessary for the realisation of the other human rights.
4 Article 27 on the rights of  minorities reads, ‘In those States
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of  their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language’.
5 The International Law Commission referred to the final
sentence of  Article 1.2 in the context of  defining the counter
measures that shall not affect States’ obligations; see General
Assembly Official Record, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement
No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 at 336 (2001).
This work will assess what the terms ‘freely dispose’,
‘deprived of ’ and ‘means of  subsistence’ imply. ‘Freely
dispose’ does not mean that there can be an unrestricted
use of  the resource. The ecological concerns must be
considered. The notion ‘deprived of ’ relates to a
situation in which forces outside the control of  the
community undermine the resource base. ‘Means of
subsistence’ must include everything which is crucial in
order to uphold life, of  which food is an essential
element. It is considered that the phrase ‘deprived of ’ is
of  most relevance in this context of  assessing the right
of  peoples to self-determination, when resources are
exploited against the will of  the original inhabitants, as
is the situation in Western Sahara.
Sepúlveda has found that there are two duties to respect
under the obligation which relate to deprivation. The
first duty is to avoid depriving individuals of  the
possibility to be self-supporting on the basis of  their
own work. The second duty is to abstain from depriving
individuals of  the means of  subsistence, particularly their
land.6
Among these authors writing in the field of human
rights, there is hence an understanding of  what the
resource dimension of  the right to self-determination
entails. These elaborations do not reflect positions
expressed by States, however. One explanation for this
is also that the body which is responsible for supervising
the implementation of  the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not bring
up questions relating to Article 1 in their examination
of  State parties’ reports. This is unlike its sister
committee, the Human Rights Committee, which does
bring up issues relating to Article 1 in their sessions,
with specific reference to indigenous peoples.
Insufficient enjoyment of  peoples of  their right to self-
determination, implying that the natural resources
cannot be freely disposed of, can represent a serious
impediment in the enjoyment of  important human
rights, such as the right to adequate food.
3
THE QUESTION OF WESTERN
SAHARA, PARTICULARLY CONTROL
OVER RESOURCES
After being a Spanish colony (since 1885) and then a
province (since 1958), the process towards decolonisation
of  Spanish Sahara was halted by the Moroccan invasion,
taking place already in October 1975. The Green March
was officially launched on November 6 the same year.
The United Nations could not, despite its strong
resolutions, prevent the Moroccan bombardment and
forced eviction of  more than half  of  the Saharawi
population. This invasion took place in clear
contradiction, and must be defined as an act of  aggression.
Spain formally withdrew from the territories on 26
February 1976. Spain however, according to the UN
Under-Secretary-General on Legal Affairs, never did in
a legal way ‘…transfer sovereignty over the territory…’7
as this can only be done in accordance with the
procedures set down by the United Nations. Hence, Spain
is still the ‘administering power’ of  Western Sahara.8
No other State has acknowledged Morocco’s territorial
control over overwhelming parts of  Western Sahara. All
legal evidences say that Morocco, by preventing the right
of  the people of  Western Sahara to exercise their right
to self  determination in accordance with UN Resolution
1514,9 acts in violation of  international law.
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6 Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of  the Obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
212-214 (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2003).
7 Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to
the President of  the Security Council), paragraph 6, UN Doc.
S/2002/161, available at http://www.arso.org/UNlegaladv.htm.
8 On the distinction between ‘administering power’ and
‘administrative power’, see Carlos R. Miguel, Los Acuerdos
de Madrid, inmorales, illegales y políticamente suicidas
(2006), available at http://www.gees.org/articulo/2344.
9 UN General Assemble Resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration
on the Granting of  Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, UN Doc. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, reads
at paragraph 5:‘Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and
Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which
have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers
to the peoples of  those territories, without any conditions
or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed
will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or
colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete
independence and freedom’.
Western Sahara is referred to as a so-called ‘non-self-
governing territories’. At the same time, Western Sahara
is dealt with by the Fourth Committee of  the UN
General Assembly, which addresses matters relating to
decolonisation. The term ‘occupied’ is not applied by
the United Nations, but for all practical purposes, it is
reasonable to hold that Western Sahara is under
Moroccan military occupation.10
An occupation implies that certain provisions of  the
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War would apply, in
conformity with Article 6, which reads:
…the Occupying Power shall be bound,
for the duration of the occupation, to
the extent that such Power exercises the
functions of  government in such
territory, by the provisions of  the
following Articles of  the present
Convention: I to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49,
51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, and 143.
The most relevant of  these provisions, in the light of
the Moroccan policy of  encouraging Moroccan settlers,
is Article 49.6, which reads, ‘The Occupying Power shall
not deport or transfer parts of  its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies.’
Moreover, the Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties
of  States states in paragraph 16.2: ‘No State has the
right to promote or encourage investments that may
constitute an obstacle to the liberation of  a territory
occupied by force.’ 11 The Moroccan investments made
particularly in and around Layoune for the purpose of
facilitating exploitation of  the natural resources must
be considered to represent an obstacle to the liberation
of  a territory occupied by force. These investments
contribute to the integration of  the economy of  Western
Sahara more strongly into the economy of  Morocco, an
integration which is considered to have ‘…potentially
enormous implications for the Moroccan economy…’12
As this article builds on the premise that the United
Nations formally considers Western Sahara to be a non-
self-governing territory, the main basis of  the
argumentation will be taken from relevant legal material
regulating such territories, even if  it is correct to
acknowledge that for all practical purposes, Western
Sahara is occupied by Morocco.
The 2002 letter from the Under-Secretary-General for
Legal Affairs to the Security Council lists several UN
resolutions, concerning non-self-governing territories,
which have been adopted.13 These resolutions neither
prohibit resource exploitation or investments, if  this is
undertaken in collaboration with and according to the
wishes of  the peoples in these territories. The litmus
test is if  the economic activities are directed towards
assisting these peoples in the exercise of  the right of
self-determination.
The territory and coast of  Western Sahara is
documented to have large amounts of  two natural
resources, phosphates and fish, as well as an
undetermined amount of  oil and gas.14 To this list can
also be added iron, uranium, titanium15 – and sand,
which has actually been a large export article, in particular
to the Canary Islands.16 The amount and potential of
each of  these first three resources will be briefly assessed.
Phosphates: It is estimated that there are still enormous
resources of  phosphate, despite heavy extraction
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10 UN General Assembly Resolution 34/37, ‘Question of
Western Sahara’, UN Doc. A/RES/34/37 (1979),
paragraph 5 reads: ‘Deeply deplores the aggravation of
the situation resulting from the continued occupation of
Western Sahara by Morocco’, while paragraph 6 calls upon
Morocco to ‘...terminate the occupation of  the territory
of  Western Sahara’.
11 UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), ‘Charter
of  Economic Rights and Duties of  the States’, UN Doc.
3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
12 Toby Shelley, Endgame in Western Sahara: What Future for
Africa’s Last Colony? 36 (London: Zed Books, 2004).
13 See Letter dated 29 January 2002, note 7 above, paragraphs
10-12.
14 ‘The Maghreb is a region of  strategic importance, not least
for its abundant natural resources. Western Sahara may soon
become an oil producer.’ See Francesco Bastagli, ‘The
Forgotten Referendum’, International Herald Tribune, 24
November 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2006/11/24/opinion/edbastagli.php. Bastagli served as
Special Representative of  the UN Secretary-General for
Western Sahara in 2005-06.
15 See Shelley, note 12 above at 78-9, observing that these are
strategic and non-substitutable resources.
16 See Shelley, note 12 above at 79, finding that the volume
recorded in 2001 was 754,579 tons of  sand.
undertaken by both Spain and Morocco.17 Western
Sahara’s shares of  Moroccan-registered sales of
phosphate imply that Western Sahara alone would be
among the world’s largest exporter of  phosphates.
Phosphate is important simply because it is non-
substitutable.
Fish: The fish delivered in the occupied Western Sahara
city of  Laayoune alone represents 38.6 per cent of  the
total Moroccan reported fish catch.18 Each year fishing
vessels bring with them more than 1 million tonnes of
fish from the seas that Morocco currently control, and
which includes the coast outside of  Western Sahara.19
Oil and gas: The amount of  oil and gas on-shore and
off-shore is still difficult to assess, but the fact that
commercially viable amounts of  oil and gas is presumed
to exist, is considered to ‘…complicate any solution.’20
However, a new situation emerged in 2006. Currently,
all contracts with the Moroccan state oil company
ONAREP are terminated, while eight companies
entered in March 2006 into agreements with the
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), granting
them offshore oil and gas licenses in a total of  nine
license areas, six off-shore the coast of  Western Sahara,
and three on-shore.21 The SADR has demarcated and
announced bids for a total of  19 searching blocs.
Currently, only parts of  the on-shore license areas,
referred to as the ‘liberated areas’, are under effective
territorial control of  the SADR.
There can be no doubt, therefore that these natural
resources represent crucial economic assets for Western
Sahara. As noted by one author: ‘…this conflict may be
perceived as being essentially about natural resources and
their exploitation by Morocco.’22 This is confirmed by
the CIA, which states: ‘Western Sahara depends on
pastoral nomadism, fishing, and phosphate mining as
the principal sources of  income for the population.’23
There has been considerable international attention
devoted to the natural resources sought to be exploited
by companies aligned with Morocco.24
4
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PREVENTING
EXPLOITATION OF THE NATURAL
RESOURCES OF WESTERN SAHARA
The basis for a legal assessment of  how any
administration of  Western Sahara shall be conducted –
including administration over natural – must start from
the premise that Western Sahara is considered a non-
self-governing territory – formally still administered by
Spain. International law has two relevant legal provisions
regulating non-self-governing territories.
First, Article 73 paragraph (b) of  the UN Charter says
that a UN member-state which is responsible for
‘administration of  territories whose peoples have not
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17 Morocco, which illegally exploits Western Sahara’s phosphate
resources, is the world’s leading exporter of  phosphate.
Morocco and Western Sahara together keep more than 50
per cent of  the world’s phosphate reserves and more than
60 per cent of  the world’s reserve base according to the US
Geological Survey, see Phosphate Rock Data prepared by
USGS, available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
commodity/phosphate_rock/phospmcs96.pdf.  See also
Arno Rosemarin,  ‘The Precarious Geopolitics of
Phosphorous’, 13 Down to Earth 27, 30 June 2004.
18 2004 figures from War on Want and Western Sahara Resource
Watch, Briefing: EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership
Agreement: Why Western Sahara Should be Excluded (2006),
available at http://www.fishelsewhere.org/documents/
Legal%20breifing%20for%20Europe.doc.
19 Eurofish Morocco: Modernisation Programme for the Fish
Industry (March/April 2003), available at  http://
www.eurofish.dk/index.php?id=1501&groupId=2.
20 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of  a Stalemate 120
(Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner, 2004).
21 See SADR Petroleum Authority Press Release dated 17 March
2006, ‘ SADR Offshore Oil & Gas License Awards:
Successful Conclusion of  the 2005 Western Sahara Licensing
Oil and Gas Initiative’, available at http://www.arso.org/
sadroilandgas170306.htm.
22 Raphael Fisera, People vs. Corporations? Self-determination,
Natural Resources and Transnational Corporations in
Western Sahara 10 (MA Thesis, European Inter-University
Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation, Venice and
University of  Deusto, Bilbao, 2005), available at http://
www.arso.org/WSthesisFi.pdf.
23 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook:
Western Sahara, available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/wi.html.
24 Toby Shelley, ‘Natural Resources and the Western Sahara’,
in  Olsson ed., The Western Sahara Conflict – The Role of  Natural
Resources in Decolonisation  17 (Uppsala: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, Current African Issues No. 33, 2006).
majority of  the inhabitants in Western Sahara, as
Moroccan settlers outnumber local Saharawis, and as
there are Saharawis who are loyal to Morocco. However,
these bodies cannot be said to represent the people of
Western Sahara. In matters relating to natural resources,
it is hence the only all-encompassing body for the
Saharawis, namely Polisario, which must be consulted.
Second, Resolution III of  the UN Conference on the
Law of  the Seas reads:
In the case of  a territory whose people
have not attained full independence or
other self-governing status recognised by
the United Nations, or a territory under
colonial domination, provisions
concerning rights and interests under the
Convention shall be implemented for the
benefit of  the people of  the territory
with a view to promoting their well-being
and development.
This resolution, which builds on Article 73 paragraph
(b) of  the UN Charter, emphasises the economic
interests of  the peoples of  the non-self-governing
territory. If  the activities related to natural resources
undertaken by an administering power are done in
accordance with the needs, interests and benefits of  the
peoples of  that territory, and in consultation with these
peoples or their representatives, the activities are not
necessarily contrary to the UN Charter or Resolution
III of  the Conference of  the Law of  the Seas.
These two legal provisions apply both to fish and to
off-shore oil and gas, but the Convention on the Law
of  the Seas obviously does not apply to on-shore
resources, such as phosphates.
In this context, the human right of people to dispose
of  their own resources, with a particular emphasis on
the ‘means of  subsistence’, gives additional legal
arguments. Hence, it can be stated that those resources
which do fall under the scope of  the Convention on
the Law of  the Seas, and are also ‘means of  subsistence’
for a people, have a stronger protection against foreign
exploitation than resources which are inland resources
and do not represent such ‘means of  subsistence’.
Are there any criteria to distinguish between resources
which represent ‘means of  subsistence’ and resources
yet attained a full measure of  self-government’ shall
‘…develop self-government, to take due account of  the
political aspirations of  the peoples, and to assist them
in the progressive development of  their free political
institutions.’
In other words, the administering state shall administer
the territories in a way that responds to the interest of
the peoples in these territories, including their
independent political interests.
Both Article 73 of  the UN Charter and the subsequent
resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly apply
both the terms ‘inhabitants’, and ‘peoples’. These two
are not necessarily the same, and it is the peoples, including
indigenous peoples, who have the rights over the natural
resources of  a non-self-governing territory. ‘Inhabitants’
is a wider category than peoples, and includes also those
not originating from the territory. As stated in Article
73 of  the UN Charter, the interests and well-being of
all inhabitants in a non-self-governing territory are
paramount. As made evident above, it is still Spain which
is the administering power in Western Sahara, even if
the administrative structures in place are set up by
Morocco, which exercises effective control over most
of  the territory.
Moreover, neither Article 73 of  the UN Charter nor the
subsequent resolutions apply the term ‘representatives’.
This term is, however, used in the 2002 letter from the
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs.25 This can
be seen as a pragmatic approach, as it would be necessary
to identify a body to relate to. The use of  the term
‘representatives’ is, however, somewhat problematic.
More specifically, how is the representative body
established and identified as being the representative
body?
In the specific context of  Western Sahara, there can be
no doubt that the identification with Polisario is very
strong among the refugees in Algeria. For the Saharawis
living in Western Sahara, there are clear indications that
the support for Polisario is very strong also here, but
the restrictions on any public expression of  sympathy
either with an independent Western Sahara or with
Polisario, make any reliable accounts very difficult.
Morocco has established its own political bodies in
Western Sahara, which might currently represent the
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25 See Letter dated 29 January 2002, note 7 above, paragraph 24.
which do not? It must be argued that ‘means of
subsistence’ cannot only refer to resources which are
used for direct human intake. Also mineral resources
which can be sold and generate financial resources, can
represent means of  subsistence. Without any income
from such mineral resources, there will obviously be
fewer possibilities to make investments in order to
strengthen the subsistence base.
At the same time, the fish living along the long shore of
Western Sahara represent a particularly important
resource, which fall both with the ‘sea’ and the ‘human
rights’ criteria. First, fish is a crucial nutritious resource.
Second, fishing represents job opportunities for a
population that no longer can rely only on nomadism.
Third, the amount of  fish available, and the vicinity to
relevant markets, implies that the economic potential
of  fishing in the sea outside of  Western Sahara is
undisputed. At the same time it must be observed that
fish has not traditionally been an important sector for
the Saharawis.
After an analysis of  the phosphates exploitation, which
is the most known resource, the fisheries resources and
then the petroleum resources will be analysed. The
analysis seeks to demonstrate that Morocco’s economic
motivations are, at least, as equally important as the
political motivations in keeping its control over the
territory.26
5
PHOSPHATES
With regard to phosphates, it was noted by the UN
Mission visiting the, then Spanish, Sahara in May 1975:
‘…the territory will be among the largest exporters of
phosphates in the world.’27
The phosphates were considered to be so important
that the Madrid Agreement,28 signed 14 November 1975
gave Spain 35 per cent of  the shares in the Bou Craa
phosphates mine, shares which Spain still holds.29 The
known reserves at Bou Craa are 132 million tonnes, and
the annual production is around three million tonnes,30
which makes it currently the third largest mine controlled
by Morocco. The potential at Bou Craa, however, is far
greater.
At the time of  the signing of  the Madrid Agreement,
70 per cent of  Morocco’s foreign currency income came
from phosphates trade.31 The Moroccan motivation for
gaining control over the phosphates resources of
Western Sahara were obvious, as Morocco by such
control would be able to control the international
phosphates trade. Morocco is still the biggest phosphates
exporter in the world.
The threat posed by Polisario against the mine itself
and the conveyor belt, initially closed down the
production at Bou Craa, but these attacks have been
less frequent after the completion of  the sand wall
through the territory in the mid-1980s and the ceasefire
in 1991. However, the conveyor belt is still subject to
attacks, even if  not all of  these attacks can be traced
back to Polisario.
The production at Bou Craa is shipped from Laayoune,
and there have not been a lack of  willing buyers. Even
those that have regretted their specific purchase after
being exposed in the media, do not categorically exclude
the possibility of  such purchases happening again: ‘…we
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26 See Shelley, note 12 above at 61-80; see also Richard Knight,
The Reagan Administration and the Struggle for Self-
Determination in Western Sahara, paper written for the
American Committee on Africa 1991, available at http://
richardknight.homestead.com/files/wsreagan.htm; and
Fisera, note 22 above.
27 Report of  the UN Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, UN
doc. A/10023/Rev.1 (1975) at p. 81.
28 The Madrid Agreement, which divided the territory of
Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauretania (which
withdrew its claim in 1979), while Spain kept certain
economic interests, is contrary both to UNGA Resolution
1514 (XV) of  1960 (‘Declaration on the granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples’), the
advisory opinion of  the International Court of  Justice of
16 October 1975 and a number of  specific UN resolutions.
29 For a more comprehensive analysis of  the phosphates
industry at Bou Craa, see Report of the International Mission
of  Investigation in Western Sahara (France Libertés-
AFASPA [Association Française d’Amitié et de Solidarité
avec les Peuples d’Afrique], 28 October to 5 November 2002).
30 See Shelley, note 12 above at 70-1.
31 See Shelly, note 12 above at 72; see also Tony Hodges, Western
Sahara: The Roots of  a Desert War 174 (Westport: Lawrence
Hill, 1983).
do not exclude that we will resume the trade after a new
evaluation.”32
The phosphates trade from Western Sahara is hence
taking place continuously, and high-ranking military
officers play important roles in the phosphates
extraction. It continues to be Western Sahara’s main
natural resource. The Western Sahara Resource Watch
has proposed that all governments must simply reject
receiving such bulk cargos of  phosphates shipped from
the port of  Laayoune.33
Phosphates will continue to be a very important resource
for the Western Sahara economy. So far, though, the
extraction of  phosphates has been done in a way which
adversely affects the interests of  the people of  Western
Sahara, the Saharawis.
6
THE EU-MOROCCO FISHERIES
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
After passing through the Fisheries Committee and the
plenary of  the European Parliament, the Fisheries
Ministers of  the EU member states decided on May 22
2006 to enter into an agreement with Morocco, which
is applicable to ‘the waters under the sovereignty or
jurisdiction of  the Kingdom of  Morocco’, giving 119
vessels, mostly Spanish, access to these waters.
The attempts to exclude the waters outside of  Western
Sahara from this Agreement hence were not successful.
In the process leading up to the agreement, arguments
presented by various representatives of  the EU have
been criticised for being less than convincing from an
Law, Environment and Development Journal
international law perspective. This article will examine
the various arguments and statements made.
EU Fisheries Commissioner Joseph Borg held in
February 2006 that the agreement was ‘…in conformity
with the legal opinion of  the United Nations issued in January
2002.’34 This is not correct, as the author of  this legal opinion,
Hans Corell, himself  stated in an interview following the EU
decision: ‘[the Swedish protests] is actually consistent with
the opinion that I expressed in a statement that I made to
the Security Council when I was the legal chief  at the UN.’35
The EU a month later issued a legal opinion which says
that the Agreement would only be legal providing it was
not “…carried out in disregard of  the interests and of
the wishes of  the local population.” The legal opinion
states that it “…cannot be prejudged that Morocco will
not comply with its obligations under international law
vis-à-vis the people of  Western Sahara.”36
This ignores the actual Moroccan policy until today. Very
little indicates that Morocco is prepared to facilitate a
fisheries policy which is defined and implemented
together with and in accordance with the wishes of  the
legitimate representative of  the Saharawian people.
Moreover, the quoted paragraph does not spcify that it
is only the former colonial people, the Saharawis, who
has legal rights over the natural resources, while the
current population, consisting to a large extent of
Moroccan settlers, do not have such rights.
In very broad terms, Morocco has no other obligations
vis-à-vis the people of  Western Sahara than to stop all
forms of  aggression and to stop impeding a referendum
on self-determination from taking place. The
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32 Boris Ryser, ‘Yara Admits Dubious Phosphate Trade’, 7 July
2005, available at http://www.newsfeeds.com/archive/soc-
culture-algeria/msg01810.html.
33 See Rod Donald (Green Party Trade Spokesperson), New
Zealand’s Phosphate Trade With Western Sahara And Why
it is Wrong, 28 July 2005,  available at http://
www.greens.org.nz/searchdocs/other9018.html, where the
following arguments are given:  participating in the pillage
of  Western Sahara, assisting in financing the illegal Moroccan
occupation and giving legitimacy to this occupation.
34 See the press release of  29 May 2006,  ‘New EU -
Morocco Fisheries Agreement in Breach of
International Law’, available at http://www.fishsec.org/
article.asp?CategoryID=1&ContextID=13. For legal
opinion, see Letter dated 29 January 2002, note 7 above.
35 EU Accepted Agreement in Occupied Waters, Interview
with the UN’s former legal chief  Hans Corell, Swedish Radio,
22 May 2006, available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
Sahara-Update/message/1758.
36 See legal opinion of  the Legal Service in European Parliament
on the  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Conclusion
of   the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the
European Community and the Kingdom of  Morocco –
Compatibility with the Principles of  International Law, SJ-
0085/06, 20 February 2006, available at  http://
www.fishelsewhere.org/legal.htm.
administering power is still Spain. Second, the political
body representing the Saharawi people, who have
traditionally inhabited Western Sahara, are strongly
against the Agreement.37 As most of  the traditional
inhabitants, are currently refugees, and as Saharawis
represent only two per cent of  those employed in fishing
in Western Sahara, there is no likelihood that they will
have any benefit from the Agreement.
It can be argued that the EU-Morocco Fisheries
Partnership Agreement represents a de facto recognition
of  Morocco’s continuing occupation of  Western Sahara.
EU enters into an agreement which covers also a territory
over which Morocco has no legal status, and hence has
no competence to make any agreement with regard to
resources found in it. As stated by the Council on Ethics
of  the Norwegian Petroleum Fund: ‘Norwegian
authorities have warned Norwegian companies against
entering into economic activities in this area because
such activities can be seen as support for the Moroccan
sovereignty claims and thus weaken the UN-sponsored
peace process.’38
Moreover, the context for the signing of  the agreement
is one in which central European actors themselves have
presented views which challenge the established and
widely-shared views regarding Western Sahara. Spain,
which has been the strongest advocate for the
Agreement, has now a foreign affairs minister, Miguel
A. Moratinos, who declares that Morocco is the
administrative power, based on the 1975 Madrid
Agreement.39 As already argued, this Agreement does
not transfer the authority over Western Sahara to
Morocco. Moreover, the Agreement was in breach of
principles of  decolonisation as set down by the UN, as
well as the 1975 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara
by the International Court of  Justice.
Hence, from an international law perspective, and
consonant with the general EU position regarding
Western Sahara, there are two options. First, the Fisheries
Agreement can be revised in order to only cover the
water under the sovereignty of  Morocco. Second, the
Fisheries Agreement can be cancelled, as is it built on a
wrongful premise that Morocco has legal competence
to enter into an agreement which also covers a territory
which Morocco occupies.
7
DO THE OIL AND GAS LICENSES POINT
TOWARDS SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR WESTERN SAHARA?
As a contrast to the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership
Agreement, the agreements entered into between eight
different oil companies and the Government of  the
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is based on an
acknowledgement that the resources of  Western Sahara
shall not be exploited unless this is for the direct benefit
for the Saharawi people, in accordance with the positions
of  their representative body, which is Polisario.
There has been a long history of  several petroleum
companies’ interest in exploring oil resources in and off
Western Sahara,40 but this interest did not materialise
in specific contracts until the (now cancelled) 2001
contracts between the Moroccan Oil Company
ONHYM and KerrMcGee and Total, respectively, and
then the contract of  2002 between SADR (Saharawi
Arab Democratic Republic)41 and Fusion Oil&Gas.42
A real change, however, happened in the first months
of  2006, with the termination of  the contract with
KerrMcGee. Later in the year, however, two new
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37 See Polisario statement regarding EU-Morocco fisheries
agreement, statement made by Mohamed Sidati, Polisario
Minister Delegate for Europe, 22 May 2006, available at http:/
/groups.yahoo.com/group/Sahara-Update/message/1757, where
Mohamed Sidati, Polisario Minister Delegate for Europe
refers to the Fisheries Agreement as a ‘very grave blunder’.
38 See Government of  Norway, Ministry of  Finance,
Recommendation on Exclusion from the Government
Petroleum Fund’s Investment Universe of  the Company
Kerr-McGee Corporation (2005), available at http://
odin.dep.no/etikkradet/english/documents/099001-
230017/dok-bn.html.
39 For references, see Miguel, note 8 above.
40 See Anthony G. Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of  Western
Sahara 340-44 (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 3rd
ed. 2006); see also Fisera, note 22 above at 47 and Shelley,
note 12 above at 65-66.
41 The SADR was declared on 28 February 1976 after the last
Spanish military presence had left. The Republic is a member
of  the African Union (AU), and the President of  the SADR,
Muhammed Abdelaziz, is also Vice-President of  the AU.
42 See Fisera, note 22 above at 52-53.
contracts were signed. New contracts have been entered
into with Moroccan authorities.43 March 2006 also saw
the signing of  contracts between SADR and no less
than eight international oil companies. These latter
contracts have a clause saying that oil exploitation is on
hold, awaiting a solution to the conflict.
As stated by the UK-based EnCore Oil: ‘No exploitation
of  the Western Sahara offshore resources will be
undertaken by EnCore until such time as the current
dispute has been resolved.’44 Another company which
has entered into an agreement with the Government of
the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic applies the
terms ‘…successful resolution to the sovereignty of  the
territory…’45
These clarifications represent challenges to the
Moroccan government and its state oil company
ONHYM, also as they took place as the last company
Kerr-McGee decided not to renew its contracts with
ONHYM. By stressing that expoitation of resources
from the territories or shores of  Western Sahara shall
be undertaken only after the conflict has found a
solution, the oil companies must be considered in
accordance with international law, as expressed by the
UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs.46
At the same time, the presentations given by the oil
companies are not fully in compliance with a precise
understanding of  the territories. As an example, Europa
Oil and Gas uses the phrase ‘…territory currently
governed by Morocco…’47 While this is not an accurate
formulation, it does not match the wrongful
formulations by central EU officials, stating that
Morocco is the ‘administering power’ of  the non-self-
governing territory of  Western Sahara.
The oil and gas agreement are important in three ways.
First, they are entered into with the political
representatives of  the Saharawian people. Second, they
are formulated in a way that recognises that the
Saharawians are the rightful people to take all decisions
regarding the exploitation of  resources in the territories.
Third, they are formulated in a way that makes it implicit
that a solution over the territories will be found.
At the same time, it is not necessarily clear what an
acceptable solution implies. To ‘resolve a dispute’ might
be different from the successful achievement of  a
‘resolution of  the sovereignty of  the territory’. The latter
phrase must be considered to be more ambitious than
the former. The first company to enter into an agreement
with the SADR, Fusion Oil & Gas, has stated explicitly
that they fully expect ‘…a just resolution that allows
the Saharawi people to control its own territory…’48
Such a formulation is more direct than the eight
companies entering into contracts with SADR in 2006,
but these contracts too point in the same direction.
8
CONCLUSION
We see that there are different scenarios for the control
over resources, depending on whether one considers
the situation in the field of fishing or in the field of oil
and gas. The legal facts are the same, as both of  these
resources are to be regulated in accordance with
Resolution III of  the UN Conference of  the Law of
the Seas. Moreover, the Western Saharan population can
make human rights-based claims, as there is a prohibition
to deprive a people of  its own means of  subsistence.
The solutions are in principle very easy. First, the EU
should revise its Fisheries Partnership Agreement with
Morocco, in order to exclude Western Sahara from its
scope. This is exactly what is done in the 2004 US-
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43 The two contracts were signed in May 2006 between
ONHYM- Kosmos Energy, see: http://www.vest-
sahara.no/files/pdf/onhym_agreements_2006.pdf.  In
December 2006, contracts were signed between the
Moroccan company San Leon and GB Oil and Gas
Ventures Limited (30%) / Island Oil & Gas plc (20%), see:
h t t p : / / w w w . i s l a n d o i l a n d g a s . c o m /
default.asp?docId=12442&newsItem=12760.
44 See Encore Oil, Western Sahara, available at http://
www.encoreoil.co.uk/pages/content/index.asp?PageID=53.
45 See Europa Oil &Gas, ‘Operations in Western Sahara’,
available at http://europaoil.co.uk/.
46 See Letter dated 29 January 2002, note 7 above.
47 See Europa Oil &Gas, note 45 above.
48 See Petroleum Exploration Society of  Australia (PESA) news,
‘Fusion Provides 200,000 km2 Study for New African
Acreage Chance’, April/May 2003, available at http://
www.pesa.com.au/Publications/pesa_news/april_03/
sahara.htm.
The oil and gas agreement, on the other hand, represent
important steps forwards for the recognition of  the
Saharawis as the people who should rightfully be in
control over its natural resources.
Morocco Free Trade Agreement.49 It should not be any
more difficult for the EU than it was for the United
States of America.
Second, international pressure should be exercised on
Morocco to get a Moroccan approval and loyal
implementation of the widely recognised peace plan as
set out in the so-called ’Baker II’.50
Third, while awaiting a solution to the conflict over the
Western Sahara territory, in accordance with principles
of  international law, as well as Security Council
Resolution 1495, there should be no involvement in
resource exploitation from the territory or water of
Western Sahara by any companies.51 Such exploitation
is predetermined to take place without the approval of
the representatives of  the population inhabiting this
territory, namely the Saharawis.
It is particularly worrying that the EU is legitimising the
exploitation of  the fishery resources outside the coast
of  Western Sahara, and that this effort is led by Spain,
which bears a considerable responsibility for the tragedy
of  the Saharawis. The arguments presented by the EU
in the process of  entering into the Fisheries Agreement
are less than convincing, and represent real threats
against the achievement of  a just and lasting peace for
the territory of  Western Sahara and an end to the
suffering of  the Saharawis, both the refugees and those
living in the occupied territories.
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49 See US Trade Representative, Letter from the Executive
office of  the President, 20 July 2004, available at  http://
w w w.house .g ov/p i t t s/ t empora r y/040719 l -u s t r -
moroccoFTA.pdf.
50 The Peace plan for self-determination of  the people of
Western Sahara (Baker II) is included as Annex II to Report
S/2003/565 of  the UN Secretary-General to the Security
Council. The Security Council adopted the plan unanimously
by Security Council Resolution 1495 of  31 July 2003, which
states in paragraph 1 that, ‘…support strongly the efforts
of  the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy and
similarly supports their Peace plan for self-determination
of  the people of  Western Sahara…’, see Security Council
Resolution 1495, ‘The Situation Concerning Western Sahara’,
UN Doc. S/RES/1495 (2003).
51 For a conclusion that the plunder of  the natural resources
‘…benefit only a few individuals…’, see France Libertés/
AFASPA, note 29 above at 36.
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